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During the long reign of behaviourism, imagination almost seemed to disappear
into “the outer darkness of intellectual irrelevance” (Morley 2005: 117). Now, after
cognitive science’s early ‘iconophobia’ (Thomas 2007), imagination research has
grown into what has been described as a ‘flourishing’ (Chalmers and Bourget 2007)
field of investigation. This relatively recent phenomenon happens to coincide, more
or less, with the arrival of “a new way of thinking about the mind and things mental
that has started to seep out of the ivory tower and set up residence in popular
consciousness” (Rowlands 2010: 1) – a way of thinking that is said to be “sweeping
the planet” (Adams 2010: 619). What is meant is a new model of the mind, the
model of ‘situated cognition’, which I take to comprise ‘embedded’, ‘enactive’,
‘embodied’ and/or ‘extended’ theories of cognition.1 While these 4e’s significantly
diverge, and even conflict in some respects (more about this in Sect. 4), they share
the view that cognition does not, or not exclusively, depend on mental
representations understood as well-individuated ‘internal’ symbols. Instead, cogni-
tion may also depend on the cognitive system’s embeddedness in the surrounding
environment (Rupert 2009; Haugeland 1998); on aspects of its activity (Noe¨ 2004;
Hurley 1998; Varela et al. 1991); on features of its embodiment (Thompson 2007;
Gallagher 2005; Haugeland 1998); and/or on material vehicles or processes that
extend into the world (Clark 2008; Clark and Chalmers 1998).
And yet, crossovers between the two exciting developments are rare. Imagi-
nation does not lend itself, or so it seems, to a situated account. In what follows I
propose that serious challenges notwithstanding, there are also reasons to think
that these may not be insurmountable, at least not for all features of imagination.
With the help of Husserl’s phenomenological analysis of ‘phantasy’
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(‘Phantasie’), i.e., sensory imagination, I highlight some of those aspects and
begin to show how they might be accommodated by some strands (some e’s) of
situated cognition. To begin with, however, some clarifications are in order.
Some of the terms that are most relevant to the discussion here are used in
specific technical senses in situated cognition theory or Husserlian phenomenol-
ogy, and some are used in both discourses but in incongruent ways. Some of these
incongruities are due to important differences in the scope of research, which, if
overlooked, can obscure both points of connection and points of divergence. I
therefore begin by laying out the necessary vocabulary and some key coordinates
of scope, i.e., of the aim and purview of situated cognition theory and Husserlian
phenomenology respectively.
1 How to Begin: Some Terminology and Clarification
of Scope
Within the cognitive sciences cognition is usually understood as information
processing, which, within the prevalent functionalist framework, is not tied to a
specific (human or non-human) processing architecture, but is meant to cross over
boundaries between human, animal and A.I. cognition. Researchers are mostly
concerned with subpersonal processes associated with adaptive flexible, not neces-
sarily human, behaviour. Within philosophy in general and phenomenology in
particular, cognition is, on the contrary, usually understood as human cognition
(for notable, mostly recent, exceptions seeAndrews 2012). Philosophers, especially
those who work in philosophy of mind, epistemology and phenomenology, investi-
gate some of the same cognitive processes as cognitive scientists, such as percep-
tion, memory, and problem solving. However, at least traditionally, they do so in
terms of potentially conscious (human) subjects and agents.
Husserl gives a wide definition of consciousness as a “comprehensive designa-
tion for any ‘mental acts’, or ‘intentional experiences’” (Husserl 2001b: V, §1). The
phenomenological slogan ‘all consciousness is consciousness of’ expresses
Husserl’s understanding that consciousness and intentionality are inextricably
linked. By this he does not mean that all intentionality is ‘conscious’ in the
sense that we are always explicitly aware of what we, for example, perceive (this
is evidently not the case). Instead he claims that intentionality is ‘lived through’
(‘erlebt’) in a mode of tacit self-awareness (Husserl 2001a: 607; Zahavi 1999,
2003). Translated into the terms of current philosophy of mind, this means that,
for Husserl, there is no intentionality without phenomenal consciousness, even
though we ordinarily pay attention to the intentional contents (the objects) of
experience. Arguably the most dominant (functionalist) view in philosophy of
mind and cognitive science is, in contradistinction to Husserl’s, that intention-
ality can be regarded in isolation from phenomenal consciousness. Intentionality
is here understood in a narrow sense as the ‘aboutness’ of, for example, mental
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or neural states or processes and computational symbols (also referred to as
‘representations’). Phenomenal consciousness, ‘consciousness’ for short, is then
attributed only to experience for which there is ‘something it’s like’ subjectively to
undergo it (often taken to be equivalent to ‘qualia’). However, the relation between
intentionality and phenomenal consciousness is highly contentious. Intentionalism
here refers to the view that phenomenal consciousness supervenes on intentionality
(Byrne 2001; Harman 1990), which in its strong version involves the view that
phenomenal consciousness can be reduced to, or is identical with representational
content (Kind 2007; Tye 1995, 2000; Dretske 1995).2 Although currently less
dominant, non-reductive views of phenomenal consciousness, which are more
compatible with a Husserlian position, have also received considerable attention
and have in some cases even involved arguments for the inverse dependence of
intentionality on phenomenal consciousness (Fasching 2012; Klausen 2008; Pitt
2004; McGinn 2004; Loar 2003; Horgan and Tienson 2002; Siewert 1998;
Strawson 1994, 2004; Searle 1992).
The issue of representation is one of the longest standing issues in philosophy
and arguably one of those most central to modern philosophy in particular. Very
generally speaking, it concerns the different ways in which (human) minds or, to
put it neutrally, cognitive systems refer to, or represent the world. With the
emergence of cognitive science and its increasing influence on philosophy of
mind, philosophical debates have shifted significantly from traditional concerns
with representational contents to (scientifically testable) concerns with the roles
representations play in cognition. In this context, representations are often consid-
ered in their function as material (e.g., neural) vehicles of content. Through British
empiricism, German (Neo-Kantian) philosophy and early psychology, the term
‘representation’ (‘Vorstellung’) also became a key term for Husserl. Mostly, he
uses ‘representation’ and ‘consciousness’ interchangeably (‘perceptual conscious-
ness’ and ‘perceptual representation’; ‘phantasy consciousness’ and ‘phantasy
representation’, etc.). While, as a phenomenologist, Husserl is not equipped to
investigate the physical nature of representational vehicles, it can still be argued
that a particular version of the content-vehicle-distinction applies to his account
(see Sect. 3).
The focus on representations has led to various divergent senses of representational-
ism and anti-representationalism (see fn. 2), but only one is directly relevant to our
concerns here. It is the view that cognition is exclusivelymediated by representations as
its only vehicles, which are individuated inside a (natural or artificial) mind (henceforth:
‘representationalism’). The corresponding ‘anti-representationalism’ accordingly
refers to the view that cognition does not, or not exclusively, depend on such
representations as its only vehicles (henceforth: ‘anti-representationalism’). It is impor-
tant to note that the oppositional pair ‘representationalism/anti-representationalism’ is
2 Intentionalism is also referred to as ‘representationalism’. I exclusively use ‘intentionalism’ in
order to avoid confusion with the sense of representationalism I outline below.
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not congruent with the further oppositional pair ‘internalism/externalism’. Internalism
regarding vehicles of cognition (henceforth: ‘vehicle internalism’) involves the
claim that all vehicles are internal to a (natural or artificial) brain, while the
corresponding externalism (henceforth: ‘vehicle externalism’) denies this claim.
However, the rejection of the claim that the vehicles of cognition exclusively consist
of discretely individuated representations does not necessarily entail the rejection of
the claim that all vehicles of cognition are intracranial. It is, for example, possible to
be an anti-representationlist to the extent that one believes that the vehicles of
cognition are systematically distributed (rather than discretely individuated); and
to be an internalist to the extent that one believes that vehicles are so distributed only
intracranially (see Sect. 4).
While Husserl has often been taken for a traditional Cartesian internalist
(Rowlands 2003; Dreyfus 1991; Rorty 1979), more recent scholarship has produced
persuasive evidence for an externalist reading. It has been suggested more recently
that he is not only an externalist regarding content – nowadays a less contentious
issue – but also a vehicle-externalist (Zahavi 2008). Since one cannot, by means of
Husserl’s phenomenology, directly confirm or disprove claims concerning the
material nature of representational vehicles, a particular notion of ‘vehicle’ must
be in play for this to be true (see Sect. 3). Further, since Husserl is concerned not
with cognition but with consciousness (in his wide sense of the term), the case of his
alleged externalism raises the question of phenomenal externalism. Phenomenal
externalism claims that the phenomenal quality of a given experience depends upon
more than just states or processes internal to the brain of the experiencer. This
position is still considerably more contentious than other versions of externalism, at
least in part because conscious experience does not lend itself as easily to the strong
functionalist approach that undergirds much of vehicle externalism.3 Since imagi-
nation is commonly considered intrinsically tied to phenomenal consciousness, the
issue of phenomenal externalism is critical for a situated approach to imagination
(see Sect. 4).
Any attempt to integrate imagination in a situated cognition framework with
the help of Husserlian phenomenology must be aware of the above differences in
terminology and scope, and of some of the difficulties they cause. It also has to
specify which, if any, strand of ‘situated cognition’ it considers fitting for an
account of imagination (see Sect. 3). In what follows I focus exclusively on
sensory imagination and argue that some of its features, described by Husserl
under the name of ‘phantasy’, do not rule out, and perhaps even call for a situated
account.
3 Even Byrne and Tye, themselves defenders of phenomenal externalism, admit that it is generally
thought “an absurd thesis, accepted by a handful of philosophers with too much respect for
philosophical theory and not enough common sense” (Byrne and Tye 2006: 242).
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2 Husserl’s Account of Imagination: From Phantasy
to Simulation
Husserl describes ‘phantasy’ (henceforth: ‘imagination’ or ‘imagining’) as a sen-
sory experience of something in its absence. He argues that perceiving and imagin-
ing share a number of features and even describes imagination as ‘quasi-
perception’. In perception as well as imagination objects are given in a modal
(visual, tactile, auditory, olfactory or gustatory) sensory way – even though in the
case of imagination the object is not normally present to the senses.4 Moreover,
perceived and imagined objects are given perspectivally, or from a (usually not
explicit) point of view.5 They are experienced as near or far, as left or right, as
below or above, as close or distant; they appear from certain angles and show partial
profiles of themselves. Both perceived and imagined objects have ‘internal’ and
‘external’ horizons (Marbach 1993: 77). Their internal horizons unfold in a series of
profiles. They can be, at least potentially, moved or rotated; or, one may move
further towards or away from them, ‘look’ at them from above or below. Their
external horizons (minimally, a figure on a background) are present as perceptual or
imaginary contexts or environments.
Moreover, perception and imagination constitute immediate intuitive awareness
of objects. In perception as well as in imagination “the intention aims at the thing
itself” (Husserl 2005: 192) – in the former case, it does so in the mode of ‘being
present in person’; in the latter case, it does so in the mode of ‘as if’. Husserl
vehemently rejects any ‘image-theory’ (or ‘sense data’ theory) of imagination,
which uses the “crude talk of internal images (as opposed to external objects)”
(Husserl 2001b: V, appx. to §§11, 20). Imagining is not viewing mental images or
being aware of mental representations. It is simulating possible experiences.
When I, for example, visualize a summer meadow, I do not ‘see’ it ‘in my mind’s
eye’ but instead I simulate possible experiences (‘quasi-perceptions’) of it. Such
simulation can be described in noetic as well as in noematic terms.6 Imagining
requires, according to these analyses, not only the ‘making present’ of an
object in a sensory mode (the summer meadow), but also what Husserl calls the
‘reproduction’ of the experience of perceiving it (Husserl 2005: 372 f.), e.g., feeling
the warm grass underneath my feat, or the sensation of seeing the sun play with its
colours. Those noetic and noematic moments together constitute imagination as a
4 It is possible, for example, to visualize an object that is perceptually available at the same time.
Whether one is in this cases presented with, in the metaphysically rigorous sense, the same
identical object, is a discussion for a different paper.
5 The point of view need not be occupied by an explicitly imagined self but can be merely implicit
in the perspectival appearance of imagined objects (Martin 2002).
6 In Husserl’s terminology, noetic analyses describe the experiencing of objects; noematic
analyses describe the experienced objects as they are experienced.
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simulation of possible experience.7 Imagining in this sense is evidently distinct
from merely supposing or considering something (which, by contrast, do not
require any simulation of sensory experience).
Imagining, then, is like perceiving, but in the mode of ‘inactuality’. When I
imagine something (visually, aurally, or in any other sense mode) it is as if I
perceive it, but not quite. Whereas in perception “the object appears to us, so to
speak, ‘in person,’ as itself present,” in imagination the object appears as merely
represented or as only possible (but not actual); “it is as though it were there, but
only as though” (Husserl 2005: 18). Husserl therefore also speaks of perception as
‘presentation’ (‘Gegenwa¨rtigung’) and of imagination as ‘presentification’
(‘Vergegenwa¨rtigung’).8 This distinction is not reducible to a difference between
perceptual and imagined intentional content, but rather points to a difference in the
modes in which those contents are taken (as ‘real’ or ‘unreal’). According to
Husserl, this is inextricably linked with the fact that the experience of the activity
of imagining is also significantly different from the experience of the activity of
perceiving.
When I imagine something I am (implicitly) aware that I can change its
attributes and that I can spontaneously begin or stop imagining it – options that I
do not have when I perceive something. Moreover, while I am imagining something
(the summer meadow again), I am still tacitly aware of my actual, and still
perceived, surroundings (the dull artificial light in my office, the computer screen
I am staring at, the keyboard under my fingers). No matter how vivid my imagina-
tion, under ordinary circumstances something (e.g., an incoming email, a phone
call, hunger or thirst) will sooner or later make me again explicitly aware of my
perceptual environment. In fact, when I lose this anchoring in the actual situation,
I may be hallucinating or dreaming, but not imagining in the sense in which I use
the term here (Marbach 1993: 83–85). To the extent that this duality – Husserl
even speaks of a ‘conflict’ (Husserl 2005: 72–75) – is not only a by-product of the
experience of imagining, but is intrinsic to it, it can be said to be constitutive of
imagining. This helps to explain why, under normal circumstances, we can easily
tell whether we are currently perceiving something or imagining it (even if we
can be mistaken, as in cases of illusion or hallucination), and why we need not
refer to differences between intentional properties of the objects in question when
we do so.
7 Recent accounts of imagination as simulation, which, however, do not make use of Husserl’s
analyses, include Thompson (2007), Thomas (2007), Currie and Ravenscroft (2002),
Martin (2002).
8 I use ‘presentification’ instead of Brough’s ‘representation’ (Husserl 2005) in order to avoid
confusion between different senses of ‘representation’.
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3 How Hungry Is the Imagination? Some Problematic
Assumptions in Situated Cognition
There are strong prima facie reasons to doubt the applicability of situated cognition
to imagination. First, imagination is commonly taken to occur ‘off-line’, i.e., in the
absence of the imagined objects or state of affairs. If one thinks of situatedness in
terms of “the densely coupled . . . ongoing perceptual link with some external
goings-on” (Clark 2005: 233), then imagination appears impervious to situated
cognition. Margaret Wilson puts it simply: “Any cognitive activity that takes place
‘off-line,’ in the absence of task relevant input and output, is by definition not
situated” (Wilson 2002: 626).9 Moreover, the issue of phenomenal externalism
poses considerable difficulties. Situated cognition, as the term suggests, typically
deals with cognition, and not with consciousness. Imagination, however, is com-
monly understood as tied to phenomenal consciousness. Unsurprisingly, this poses
less of a problem for situated positions with strong sympathies for phenomenology
(Hurley 2008; Thompson 2007; Gallagher 2005; Noe¨ 2004; Noe¨ and Thompson
2004; Hurley and Noe¨ 2003; Varela et al. 1991). However, serious objections have
been raised (Clark 2009; Prinz 2009), and it is still the case that situated cognition
overwhelmingly deals with explanations of non-conscious, subpersonal cognitive
states and processes.
Finally, situated cognition research is generally functionalist in its outlook and
therefore, in its most strongly functionalist strands, neutral to specific material
realizations of cognitive systems. True to some behaviourist ancestry, researchers
are mostly concerned with subpersonal processes associated with adaptive flexible,
not necessarily human, behaviour. ‘On-line’ cognition involves task relevant inputs
and outputs (Wilson 2002) and the exploitation of “the continuing presence of some
tangible target” (Clark 2005: 234; my emphasis). Imagination, however, is usually
regarded as paradigmatic of specifically human capacities for high-level cognition,
creativity and non-purposive activity, which may or may not involve observable
behaviour.
These three challenges to a situated approach to imagination get some of their
traction from a misconstrual of imagination, which is so pervasive that it is often
taken to be self-evident. It assumes that imagining, because it usually occurs in
the absence of the imagined object, is non-relational, or non-world-involving,
and, further, that it therefore exclusively involves internal representations.
Depending on whether one is committed to a sense-datum theory or to
intentionalism, one may consider these representations as mental images
(mirroring the corresponding percepts), or as intentional contents (just like the
contents of the corresponding perception, but without the commitment to things
being as they are represented). The so-called ‘imagery debate’, which held the
9Note that Wilson uses a far narrower definition of ‘situated cognition’ than I do throughout this
article (see fn. 1).
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field in its grip for about 30 years,10 can be read as an expression of cognitive
science’s oscillation between these two alternatives. It thereby inserts itself
seamlessly into a long tradition of internalist representationalism in philosophy;
and it reduces the difference between perception and imagination to the difference
between a mental representation with or without the presence of a perceptual
stimulus (Kosslyn et al. 2006: 4).
Husserl’s account of imagination as a simulation of perception does not neces-
sarily challenge internalist representationalism (simulation could still be ‘all in the
head’), unless one considers three further assumptions prevalent in philosophy of
mind and cognitive science, which I believe are all problematic. First, I believe that
the widely accepted distinction between on-line and off-line cognition deserves
more critical attention. Off-line cognition has been associated with cases of cogni-
tion that Clark and Torribio (1995) have dubbed ‘representation hungry’, such as
cases of “counterfactual reasoning or abstraction, that are by their very nature out of
bounds to explanations that do not utilize representations” (Shapiro 2011: 207). The
inclusion of imagination in this group of ‘hungry’ cases seems natural. An exami-
nation of this assumption has been hampered by what we may call the ‘perception
bias’, which is motivated by a commitment to the investigation of ‘densely coupled’
processes that facilitate observable ‘adaptive flexible’ behaviour in the ‘presence of
a tangible target’. Perception clearly fills these slots, and, especially with an
intentionalist/functionalist model in hand, its phenomenal qualities can easily be
ignored.
While he readily adopts the on-line/off-line distinction in his work, Clark has
challenged the rigidity with which it is applied. He argues that at least some cases of
off-line thinking occur within structures that offer “surrogate situatedness” through
“real- world models, diagrams, and other concrete external symbols” (Clark 2005:
234). He blames the widespread failure to recognize the importance of surrogate
situatedness on the common conflation between ‘disengaged’ and ‘decontex-
tualized’ cognition. Disengaged cognition operates “in the absence of its ultimate
target, as when we think of that which is not close to hand” and ought to be
distinguished from decontextualized cognition, which operates “without the kinds
of dense, perceptually saturated local couplings that most obviously reward treat-
ment in dynamical and situated terms” (Clark 2005: 233 f.). Off-line cognition that
involves surrogate situatedness, Clark argues, is disengaged but still contextualized,
which is to say that it is “disengaged but not disembodied” (Clark 2005: 236). True
to the perception bias, Clark insists on the perceptual nature of the surrogates in
question. Thus he speaks of “real world” models and symbols understood as “stable
10Here is a reminder of that debate: On one side, Hannay (1971, 1973), Kosslyn (1980, 1994), Tye
(1988, 1991), Cohen (1996) and others have defended pictorial or imagistic accounts of imagina-
tion. On the other side, it has been claimed that mental imagery is too indeterminate to represent
pictorially (or even ‘quasi-pictorially’) (Fodor 1975) and that therefore imagining is more likely to
require the use of amodal descriptions (Dennett 1969; Pylyshyn 1973, 2003).
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external structures that stand in for absent states of affairs” (Clark 2005: 234) that
“augment” or “amplify” human cognition (Clark 2005: 236, 239). And he further
insists, in keeping with the deep functionalist commitments of much of situated
cognition, “that surrogate situations should be purpose-built” to provide “some
leverage for real-world action and intervention” (Clark 2005: 237). This goes some
way to drawing in some, perhaps less paradigmatic, cases of imagination into
situated cognition, and into an extended account in particular. And yet, imagining
often occurs independently from external perceptual structures or real-world
purposes. Clark’s account, while it shows that imagination is not ‘representation
starving’, still leaves it for the most part ‘representation hungry’.11
It is not possible to give a fully satisfying account here, but I want to suggest that
considering a further distinction (besides ‘on-line/off-line’) can help us see a way
towards a more comprehensive account, namely the distinction between an empiri-
cal and a transcendental stance towards representations. The empirical stance
considers them empirical objects, which can be observed and described as, for
example, neural processes or psychological items, such as mental images. How-
ever, the very idea of a ‘stance’ implies that a different stance is possible. The
transcendental stance, in contradistinction to the empirical one, considers vehicles
not simply as empirical objects but as processes that make possible the experience
of objects on the personal level (without, of course, thereby denying their material
nature). The shift from the empirical to the transcendental stance does not necessi-
tate but encourages the shift from taking vehicles as states to taking them as
processes; for it highlights unnecessary objectifying tendencies in thinking about
vehicles as individuated, object-like items in the mind’s ‘machinery’. Even more
importantly perhaps, it discourages any reductive tendencies that dismiss phenom-
enological accounts as irrelevant to scientific explanations of subpersonal cogni-
tion; for it highlights that such explanations are only explanatory across non-human
and human cognition, if, in the case of human cognition, they consider phenome-
nological descriptions of what the vehicles under scrutiny are said to make possible.
The recognition of the two distinct stances has been hampered by what we may
call the ‘naturalist bias’, which is motivated by the necessary reliance of science
on the investigation of observable objects. The practice of scientific observation
comes with the perfectly understandable inclination to consider all objects as
empirical objects, that is, as items or processes that can be examined by scientific
observation. This is trivially true when one adopts the empirical stance. The
transcendental stance, on the contrary, considers vehicles not only in terms of
their material nature or location but also as (neural and extra-neural) processes in
virtue of which cognition occurs.12 It thereby considerably expands the scope of
11 I take the distinction between ‘representation hungry’ and ‘representation starving’ cognition
from (Shapiro 2011: 208).
12 I am not suggesting that one has to commit to one or the other stance, or that one or the other
stance is ‘better’ than the other. Although I cannot argue for it here, I believe that investigations not
only of consciousness but also of cognition more generally require awareness of both stances and
probably switches between them, depending on the concrete task at hand.
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what can count as vehicle (not only empirically observable, well individuated
objects/processes with determinate locations!) and spurs dynamic and holistic
models, not only for personal cognitive engagements but also for subpersonal,
vehicular explanations of cognition. It turns the focus away from vehicles as
individual parts (empirical object in their own right) and towards their contribu-
tion to the dynamic cognitive process as a whole.13 Moreover, the transcendental
stance allows for a certain ‘agnosticism’ concerning vehicles of consciousness, in
the sense that it makes no demands for token-token correlations between neural
and conscious states.14 It thereby circumvents some of the worries about phenom-
enal externalism and thus encourages attempts to integrate consciousness into a
situated account of cognition. Husserl takes this transcendental stance when he
describes imagination not only in terms of the ways in which imagined objects
appear, but also in terms of the complex tacit and explicit, noetic and noematic
processes in virtue of which they can appear in the way they do. He thus delivers
an account not only of the contents of the experience but also, in a certain sense, of
its vehicles.15
I think of the transcendental stance as a stance that is readily adopted in a range
of strands of situated cognition theories, even though it is rarely made explicit (for
exceptions to this rule seeWard 2012 and Rowlands 2010). Approaches influenced
by phenomenology and/or dynamic systems theory, in particular, are likely to
reflect both empirical and transcendental stances. This might explain differences
amongst different strands of situated cognition that cut across the standard
distinctions of the 4 e’s. The assessment of whether imagination is susceptible to
situated cognition must take these differences into consideration.
13 Gallagher has recently illustrated this point by making the analogy between cognition and
digging ‘by means’ of a shovel. The point of including the shovel as an ‘extension’ of the process
“is not that I extend my musculature – the point is that my digging is something extended from my
bodily musculature across the shovel and into the ground” (Gallagher 2011).
14 Sceptics of phenomenal extension whose doubts seem to be based on a strictly empirical stance
include, for example, Fodor who points out that we do not know “even to a first glimmer, how a
brain (or anything else that is physical) could manage to be a locus of conscious experience. This
. . . is, surely, among the ultimate metaphysical mysteries; don’t bet on anybody ever solving it”
(Fodor 1998: 83; my emphasis). See also Prinz: “We have never found any cells outside the brain
that are candidates as correlates for experience. Such cells would have to co-vary with conscious
states in content and time course” (Prinz 2009: 425). Both are cited by Clark who concludes that
“the machinery of conscious experience is (probably) all in the head” (Clark 2009: 987) because he
believes that extra-cranial processes can only causally, but not constitutively, drive consciousness
(as opposed to cognition).
15 Although I cannot argue for it here, I believe that the transcendental stance is fully compatible
with and even should be part of empirical research. I thus do not see it standing in conflict with
(some) recent attempts to ‘naturalize’ phenomenology.
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4 Husserl’s Account of Imagination in the Context
of Situated Cognition: Embodied? Enacted?
Embedded? Extended?
Let us return to the general description of situated cognition I gave in the introduc-
tion. In most general terms, what unites the 4e’s under the umbrella of situated
cognition is the hypothesis that cognition does not, or at least not exclusively,
depend on mental representations understood as well-individuated ‘internal’
symbols. Instead, cognition may also depend on the cognitive system’s
embeddedness in the surrounding environment; on aspects of its activity; on
features of its embodiment; and/or on material vehicles or processes that extend
into the world. However, with the idea of situated cognition increasingly gaining
influence in the fields of philosophy of mind and cognitive science, more attention
has been paid to the significant differences between the approaches it comprises
(Menary 2010; Rowlands 2010). These differences include, but are not exhausted
by, the difference between the various cognitive extensions suggested (body,
action, environment, etc.).
Much rides on what one believes is the right interpretation of the general
expression ‘depend’, as in ‘cognition may also depend on . . .’. For example, it is
in one sense trivial that cognition ‘depends’ on the (extra-neural) body. Living
organisms need living (digesting, blood-circulating, etc.) bodies in order to do
anything, including cognizing; and even software needs to be instantiated in some
hardware. The much more interesting and more controversial claim of embodied
cognition is that the links between brain and body are not merely causal but
constitutive. This is to say, bodily processes are not merely externally, i.e., causally
or dispositionally, supporting but are intrinsic parts of cognition. Something similar
holds for enactive and extended approaches, while the embedded approach has been
singled out as the least ambitious, or most cautious, approach of the four. For
embodied, enactive and extended approaches, it has been argued that the relevant
cognitive extensions of situated cognition “are not merely noncognitive
accompaniments that facilitate the ‘real’ process of cognition that occurs inside
the head or in which the ‘real’ process is causally embedded” but “are genuinely
cognitive components of the overall cognitive process” (Rowlands 2010: 129, my
emphasis).16 It seems almost trivial to claim that imagination is, in a modest sense,
‘embedded’ in bodily, technological, cultural etc. structures and processes. But
what about an embodied, enactive or extended approach to imagination?
The answer to this question is made more difficult by the fact that it is not
entirely clear what it means to be a ‘genuinely cognitive component of cognition’.
Neither is it clear what it means to be ‘constitutive of cognition’. Much of the many
disputes amongst advocates of different e’s are fueled by disagreements about
whether some supposed cognitive extension really is constitutive, or merely causal,
16 This has also been positively recognized by advocates of the embedded approach (Rupert 2009).
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or ‘supportive’, after all. In an attempt to clear some of the thicket of these debates,
Itay Shani (2013) has recently proposed that there are at least two principal ways of
understanding the contested issue: in terms of mental states, which motivates what
Shani calls ‘Mental States Externalism (MSE)’; and in terms of processes, which
motivates what Shani calls ‘Process Externalism (PE)’. I take MSE to be typical for
an empirical stance, and PE to be typical for a transcendental stance towards
vehicles of cognition. The point of this for our purposes here is that it is perfectly
possible to hold both PE and not-MSE. That is, it is not contradictory to claim that
“at least some cognitive processes are constituted, in part, by trans-cranial (that is,
bodily and environmental) variables” and not that “mental states may be similarly
externalized”, which is the position that Shani actually holds (Shani 2013).17 Clark
and Chalmers, on the contrary, seem to advance a far less moderate and far less
inclusive position: ‘PE iff MSE’ (Clark 2008, 2009, 2012; Clark and Chalmers
1998). In that sense, as Shani points out “MSE is philosophically more radical: for
while PE says that there is more to cognition than the workings of inner mental
states, MSE implies that there is more to mental states than inner mental states!”
(Shani 2013).
With this distinction in hand it becomes much easier to answer the question,
which, if any, strands of situated cognition could accommodate imagination. On the
one hand, approaches involving MSE – no matter whether embodied, enactive, or
extended – would imply the claim that there is more to mental states of imagination
than inner mental states. If one assumes that imaginative mental states are tied to
phenomenal consciousness, then this amounts to the claim that there is more to
conscious mental states of imagination than inner mental states. This is indeed a
hard position to argue for, as it seems to imply a rather literal sense of phenomenal
externalism. On the other hand, approaches involving only PE – no matter whether
embodied, enactive, or extended – would imply the far more moderate claim that
there is more to imagining than the workings of internal mental states. This is the
claim that Husserl’s account of imagination invites us to consider. He proposes a
notion of sensory imagination as an unfolding dynamic and complex process of
simulation that involves not only an intentional directedness towards, but also an
embodied engagement with objects that are taken by the cognitive system to be
unreal or absent, but nonetheless ‘external’, i.e., different from the system itself and
situated in an environment other than the system’s actual, i.e., presently perceived
surroundings.
I am not claiming that this will open up an entirely new direction but I believe it
may support and perhaps even invigorate research already in progress that explores
anti-representationalist cognitive processes involved in imagination. Most of the
research undertaken in this regard is still internalist. In fact, as Robbins and Aydede
point out, in “that sense, ‘embodied cognition’ is something of a misnomer, at least
as far as the bulk of research that falls under this heading is concerned.” (Robbins
and Aydede 2009: 5) And the same would have to be said about enactive models.
17 At the time of writing this, Shani’s article is pre-published online without page numbers.
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The idea of on-line embodiment/enaction usually refers to the dependence of
cognition on dynamic interactions between the sensorimotor brain and the relevant
parts of the body. Off-line embodiment refers to the dependence of cognition on
sensorimotor areas of the brain even in the absence of sensory input and motor input
(Gallese 2005; Niedenthal et al. 2005; Barsalou 2003; Bartolomeo 2002; Jeannerod
1994, 1995, 1997, 2001).
However, the transcendental stance and PE allow for a much wider sense of both
embodiment and enaction and therefore, at least potentially, for a much wider scope
of embodiment and enaction in imagination.18 While a typical MSE-question
concerning imagination may ask whether “the most local machinery whose activity
is sufficient” for imagining will “include more than the brain” (Clark 2009: 987), a
typical PE-question may ask far more generally whether some of the activity of
imagining intrinsically involves engagement with trans-cranial (embodied,
enactive, environmental) structures. A further possible sense of situatedness
might follow from Husserl’s claim that the conflict between imagining and perceiv-
ing is constitutive of imagining. This would suggest that it is impossible to investi-
gate imagining accurately or appropriately without investigating its relation to
simultaneously occurring perceptual processes.19 If that is the case, then the
respective perceptual situatedness might have to be considered ‘part of’ imagining,
and imagining would not be quite as off-line as it first appeared.20
Finally, not only embodied and enactive accounts, but also extended accounts of
imagination may rid themselves of some of their counter-intuitiveness in light of
this discussion. For this, I return to Clark’s proposal that something like ‘surrogate
situatedness’ might be at play in some cases of imagination, which makes use of
‘real world’ models. A loosening of the perceptual and naturalist biases, and a
departure from MSE, allows for the consideration that not only ‘real world’
models but also imagined environments and situations can contribute cognition,
e.g., through complex feedback loops that involve simulated scenes not only as
products of prior imagining but also as transformative elements of further imagin-
ing.21 We could call this ‘simulated situatedness’. Such a conception might even
hold a key to the functionalist extension of imagination to non-human and even
18 This might include even ‘over-extended’ factors, such as the ones Gallagher has recently
mentioned, namely legal systems, language systems, etc. (Gallagher 2011).
19 Romdenh-Romluc (in this volume) points out that imagining can affect perceptions about the
actual environment of a perceiver/imaginer.
20 Empirical research on the ‘dual visual systems’ hypothesis might be helpful in testing this. Even
though Clark uses it to argue against a specific enactive account of cognition, other interpretations
and applications to imagination might be possible (see Ward et al. 2011). Clark also points to the
“duality of perception and imagination” in one of his recent rejections of enactivism and uses it to
argue for the complexity of intra-cranial processes of perceptions (Clark 2012: 761). I cannot argue
for it here but I believe that a transcendental stance and PE allow for the inverse interpretation of
the same empirical data, namely in support of a trans-cranial account of imagination.
21 The vague term ‘constitutive’ has recently been specified by the term ‘transformative’ in order
to respond to objections of ‘cognitive bloat’ (see for example Shani 2013; Gallagher 2011).
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non-conscious minds. Surprisingly, then, Husserl may have provided us with an
account that enables a conception of non-human imagination. After all, the idea that
computers ‘simulate’ alternative scenarios and possibilities is hardly a shocking
idea, and nobody expects those simulations to involve phenomenal consciousness.
Giving up some problematic assumptions concerning the nature of imagination
might just help to establish a coherent account that crosses over boundaries between
human, animal and A.I. cognition.
5 Conclusion
Husserl’s phenomenological account of imagination helps to make visible certain
conceptual blindspots that I believe obscure potential avenues for an integration of
imagination in situated cognition. In particular, the insistence on a narrow and rigid
application of the on-line/off-line distinction stands out as misleading in this regard.
I argue that the inclusion of a transcendental stance in the interpretative repertoire
and the adoption of process externalism facilitate a loosening of this distinction.
They might also facilitate a more effective interchange between imagination
research in cognitive science and phenomenology. Given that Husserl has provided
us with the most extensive material on imagination (exceeding by far even
Sartre’s), it is critical to this aim that Husserl is not excluded from the range of
relevant resources based on outdated representationalist and internalist
interpretations of his work.22 While his phenomenological reflections do not them-
selves provide the methodological tools to test empirically any claims regarding
subpersonal processes, they certainly encourage us to challenge some of the
traditional background assumptions concerning cognition, consciousness and imag-
ination that could otherwise close off valuable avenues for empirical as well as
non-empirical research.
My observations here are restricted to cases of sensory imagination, and only to
some of its most obvious features at that. There are, of course, many more senses of
imagination, and even sensory imagination includes many more aspects than those I
have discussed. Among those aspects, the issue of affectivity is undoubtedly one of
the most important. It has been argued (see Ratcliffe, Micali; both in this volume)
that affect permeates our perceptual openness to the world and potentially
constrains or transforms the ways in which an environment can appear to a
perceiver. If this is true for perceiving, then we can expect it to be at least as
relevant for imagining. Moreover, what and how we imagine is unlikely to be
independent from intersubjectively spread beliefs, values and wishes. A compre-
hensive investigation of imagination would therefore profit from research
motivated by Husserlian notions of ‘transcendental intersubjectivity’ and ‘life-
22 For a powerful demonstration of Husserl’s resourcefulness in this regard see Moran (in this
volume).
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world’ (see Heina¨maa, Pulkinnen and Nenon, all in this volume). In this context,
Gallagher’s recent suggestion that “certain social institutions (including social
practices)” should be considered “mental institutions” because “without them,
specific classes of cognitive processes would simply not exist” can be expected to
have direct implications on imagination (Gallagher 2011). Finally, a rich account of
imagination must consider issues of possibility and freedom. Phenomenological
approaches tend to be sensitive to the complex ways in which possibility and
freedom (both real and apparent) are bound by embodiment and enculturation
(see Romdenh-Romluc, de los Reyes Melero, Micali, Ratcliffe; all in this volume).
They therefore have much to offer us for a potentially situated account of what used
to be considered the most ‘mental’ of human projects.23
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